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FORMAL AMENDMENT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL ENDURANCE: THE 
STRANGE CASE OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 
Writing in the early 1960s about the wave of decolonisation that was occurring 
across the British Empire, the distinguished constitutional scholar, Kenneth 
Wheare, predicted that these former colonies, which had attained their 
independence by means of an Act of the imperial Parliament, would very quickly 
move to replace their independence constitutions with ‘autochthonous’ 
constitutions enacted by their own sovereign parliaments. This prediction has 
proved largely accurate in the case of many of Britain’s former colonies, in Africa 
for example, which were replaced in their entirety almost before the ink was dry 
on the paper, but it has proved to be almost entirely inaccurate in the case of 
Britain’s former colonies in the Commonwealth Caribbean. With the exception of 
Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago all of the remaining countries in the region 
retain the constitutions that were bestowed upon them by means of an Act of the 
British Parliament upon their independence. In some cases, for example Jamaica, 
the independence Constitution has endured for over 50 years, and Jamaica is 
followed closely by Barbados where the independence Constitution has endured 
for 49 years. The constitutions of these two countries have thus already 
exceeded the average lifespan for democratic constitutions, which is 42 years,1 
and there are others which will soon exceed this benchmark.2 
Elkins et al have famously argued that one of the key factors in explaining a 
constitution’s endurance is its flexibility; that is, the inclusion of formal 
amendment procedures which allow the constitution to adapt to meet changing 
political, social and economic circumstances. According to Elkins et al this 
flexibility is crucial to constitutional endurance because ‘it offers an ongoing and 
inclusive alternative to wholesale replacement of the constitution,’ thus helping 
to maintain the core elements of the constitutional bargain while all the time  
generating ‘a vital constitutional politics.’3  Rigid constitutions, by contrast, 
because they do not allow for the readjustment of the constitutional bargain  
                                                        
1 Z Elkins, T Ginsburg, and J Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2009) 32. 
2 For example, The Bahamas, which  gained independence in 1973. 
3 Elkins et al, n1 above at 82 
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from time to time are much less resilient and much more likely to be replaced in 
their entirety.4 While not wishing entirely to disavow this theory, I propose to 
show in this chapter that the longevity of the independence constitutions of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean does not fit comfortably within this account of 
constitutional endurance for at least two reasons.   
The first is that the constitutions of a number of the eastern Caribbean islands 
are extremely rigid, and include some of the most onerous referendum 
requirements to be found anywhere in the Commonwealth. Yet, as I will 
demonstrate, they have proven to be no less resilient than the constitutions of 
neighbouring countries which are less rigid. Their endurance is all the more 
remarkable in view of the profound disconnect between the procedures that 
were followed at the time of their creation by the so-called constituent power, 
Britain, and the constraints that the constituent power placed on the constituted 
power in order to amend the constitution.5 The second reason is that even in 
those countries with relatively flexible constitutions, which permit constitutional 
amendment by means of a simple majority in a referendum or a special 
legislative majority, constitutional reform has still proved to be remarkably 
difficult to achieve. There have thus been relatively few amendments to these 
ostensibly flexible  constitutions, and where they have occurred they have 
tended to be conservative, ‘directed toward perfecting the system by preserving 
its essence intact.’6  
I propose, therefore, to offer an alternative explanation for constitutional 
endurance in the region, which sheds a different light on the rationale for the 
inclusion of formal amendment rules in the context of the decolonisation of the 
region, and which is informed by Ginsburg and Melton’s theory of ‘amendment 
culture.’7 This involves recognising that within any constitutional system there is 
‘a borderline level of resistance to formal constitutional change,’ which can ‘vary 
                                                        
4 Ibid. 
5 As discussed by Yaniv Roznai in chapter (?), ‘The Spectrum of Constitutional Amendment Powers’. 
6 P Sutton (1999), ‘Democracy in the Commonwealth Caribbean’, Democratization 6:1, 67-86, at 
69. 
7 T Ginsburg and J Melton, ‘Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment 
Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 472. 
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according to the political weight attached to the value of entrenchment.’ 8  
Amendment culture thus encompasses ‘a set of attitudes about the desirability of 
constitutional amendment, which exists independently of the substantive issue 
under consideration.’9 I will argue that this is a particularly helpful analytical tool 
in the context of the Commonwealth Caribbean because it suggests that there 
may be a contextual explanation for the failure of the region’s governments to 
effect constitutional reform, which does not depend exclusively on the existence 
of particular institutional obstacles, and which, while subject to some local 
variation, also functions at a regional level. I intend, however, to go further than 
merely asserting the existence of such a culture by identifying the factors that 
have contributed to the emergence of such a culture across the region.  
The paper is in two parts. In Part I, I will discuss the rationale for the inclusion of 
formal amendment rules in Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions, which had 
very little to do with promoting flexibility and everything to do with securing the 
survival of the region’s political leaders in the post-independent state as well as, 
in some cases,  preserving in perpetuity the system of government inherited 
from the former colonial power. In Part II, I will explore the impact of these 
formal amendment rules upon post-independence constitutional reform in the 
region and their interaction with the region’s amendment culture. In conclusion I 
will argue that while the experience of the Commonwealth Caribbean may not 
invalidate Elkins at al’s theory about constitutional design and the importance of 
flexibility it does demonstrate that a theory which is based on constitutional 
design alone is not sufficiently rich to capture the other forces that may 
contribute to constitutional endurance. Particularly for postcolonial societies, 
such as those in the Commonwealth Caribbean, it is necessary to take account of 
the experience of colonial rule and how this informed both the institutional 
structure for amending the constitution as well as attitudes towards 
constitutional amendment in the postcolonial era.  
 
                                                        
8 Ibid. 
9 Ginsburg and Melton n15 above at 12. 
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PART I THE RATIONALE FOR THE INCLUSION OF FORMAL 
AMENDMENT RULES IN COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONS 
Though there is some variation as between Commonwealth Caribbean 
constitutions in terms of the provisions that they entrench and the degree to 
which those provisions are entrenched, the two most common amendment rules 
to be found in these constitutions are special legislative majorities and 
referendum requirements. In most countries special legislative majorities are 
necessary, but not sufficient, to effect constitutional amendment since, 
regardless of the size of the special legislative majority, the amendment still 
needs to be a approved by a prescribed majority of citizens voting in a 
referendum.  
1. Special legislative majorities   
In some cases a special legislative majority involves no more than an absolute 
majority of all the members of the House, whether or not all the members of the 
House are present when the vote is taken.10 In most cases, however, the 
requirement is more demanding; involving a two-thirds or even a three-quarters 
parliamentary majority in order to approve a constitutional amendment, 
depending upon the importance of the constitutional provision to be amended. 
This majority can take different forms. In countries, such as Antigua, Belize and 
St Lucia, it is two-thirds or three-quarters of all the members of the House of 
Representatives only; thereby allowing the elected House to bypass the Senate, 
which is wholly nominated. 11  In those countries with unicameral parliaments, 
such as Dominica, Guyana and St Vincent, it is two-thirds of all the elected 
members; 12  thus again allowing the elected element to bypass the nominated 
element. In the Bahamas, Barbados, and Jamaica, however, it is two-thirds of all 
members of both Houses of Parliament.13 In Trinidad and Tobago too, for the 
                                                        
10 See, for example, s.49(4) Barbados and s.49(b) Jamaica. 
11 s.47(2) Antigua, though the Senate can delay the Bill for one parliamentary session (s.55); 
s.69(3) and (4) Belize; and s.41(3) to (5) St Lucia 
12 s.42(2) Dominica; Article 164(2) Guyana and s.38(2) St Vincent. 
13 Article 54(2) Bahamas; s.49(2) Barbados; s.49(40(a) Jamaica. 
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more deeply entrenched provisions, it is a three-quarters majority of all 
members of  the House of Representatives and a two thirds majority of all 
members of the Senate.14  
The standard rationale for the inclusion of a procedure for amending any 
constitution is the need for constitutions to adapt to changes in society. Over an 
extended period of time a constitution may no longer adequately meet the needs 
of the society for which it was designed or may embody principles that have long 
since been rejected by that society.15 In such circumstances it will be necessary 
to have some means of amending the constitution. However, amendment rules 
that insist on special procedures, such as special legislative majorities, arguably 
detract from this objective by making the constitution more difficult to amend, 
and opens amendment rules to the criticism that they are counter-majoritarian 
and, therefore, undemocratic.16  This criticism is usually countered by two 
arguments. Firstly, that the broad consensus which is required to achieve a 
special legislative majority expands the class of persons whose interests are 
taken into account before a constitution can be amended, thereby making the 
process, arguably, even more democratic than that required for enacting 
ordinary legislation.17 Secondly, that because the support of the opposition is 
usually required to satisfy a special legislative majority such a provision creates 
‘a climate or environment of deliberation’ about the content of the proposed 
amendment and forces those advocating the amendment to advance arguments 
‘based on general and abstract principle while avoiding narrow partisan or 
sectoral interests.’18  This should, in turn, ensure that the amendment becomes 
part of the constitution ‘with a near conclusive presumption of legitimacy.’19  
                                                        
14 s.54(3) (i) and (ii) Trinidad and Tobago. 
15 R Ku, Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change 64 Fordham Law 
Review 535 (1995), 542 
16 CL Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Harvard University Press; Cambridge MA; 2001) 
10-25  
17 L G Sager, ‘The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution’, in (J Ferejohn et al, ed.s 2001) 
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule 131-133.   
18 J Ferejohn and L Sager, ‘Commitment and Constitutionalism’ University of Texas Law Review 
(2003) 81: 1929-63 at 1957. 
19 BP Denning and JR Vile, ‘The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A Response to David 
Strauss’ Tulane Law Review (2002) 77: 247-82. 
 6 
These may be compelling arguments for the inclusion of formal amendment 
rules, such as the requirement for a special legislative majority, but they were 
certainly not articulated at the time the region’s independence constitutions 
were being drafted. Instead, the main reason for including  a requirement for a 
special legislative majority, and thus making the constitution more difficult to 
amend, was to secure the survival of the region’s political leaders in the post-
independent state. Parkinson thus argues that in Jamaica, where the negotiations 
surrounding independence took place against the backdrop of an upcoming 
election, the result of which was uncertain, with the two main parties - the 
Peoples National Party and the Jamaica Labour Party  - anxious about the rise of 
the minority Peoples Progressive Party, the two main parties sought to secure 
their dominance by making provision for a two-party system and enshrining the 
office of the Leader of the Opposition within the independence Constitution.20 
This was then ‘locked-in’ by the inclusion of an entrenchment mechanism, which 
ensured that provisions, such as those establishing the Leader of the Opposition, 
could not be altered without a two-thirds majority of both Houses of 
Parliament.21 Far from being concerned to facilitate constitutional amendment in 
the future, or to deepen and enrich the debate that should precede constitutional 
amendment, the inclusion of a requirement for special legislative majorities was 
thus motivated primarily by considerations of realpolitick. 
One of the foremost scholars of the new Commonwealth constitutions that 
emerged in the wave of decolonisation that took place in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, S A de Smith, has also written of the level of distrust that existed amongst 
political leaders of Britain’s former colonies who feared that they might be the 
losers in the independence stakes.22  In de Smith’s view it was this distrust that 
led directly to the inclusion of rigid amendment procedures in these new 
Commonwealth constitutions:   
[I]n drafting a new constitution for a new state it may be unrealistic to 
begin with presumptions in favour of brevity and flexibility. Often it will 
                                                        
20 C Parkinson, Bills of Rights and Decolonization: The Emergence of Domestic Human Rights 
Instruments in Britain’s Overseas Territories (Oxford, UK; Oxford University Press; 2007) 
21 s.49 Jamaica Constitution 
22 A distinguished constitutional scholar and legal adviser to the British Government.   
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be politically impossible to obtain general agreement on a new 
constitution unless it is both lengthy and rigid. Those who don’t expect to 
find themselves in power on Independence Day may well be profoundly 
distrustful of the majority party and its leaders, and the price of their 
acquiescence in the new order is therefore likely to be a somewhat 
cumbersome constitutional machine with built-in resistances against 
subsequent modifications.23  
The most rigid amendment procedures to be found in Commonwealth Caribbean 
constitutions are the referendum requirements, some of which are especially 
onerous, but, as well see below, their inclusion also owes much to the British 
Government’s distrust of the region’s independence leaders.  
 
2. Referendum requirements 
The constitutions of all but three countries in the region - Barbados, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and  Belize – stipulate that various constitutional provisions require, 
in addition to the approval of a special legislative majority, the approval of a 
prescribed majority of citizens voting in a referendum before they can be 
amended. In the three countries that do not include a referendum requirement it 
was adjudged that this additional barrier to constitutional amendment was 
unnecessary. As the Wooding Commission, which a decade after independence 
had been charged with reviewing and recommending reforms to Trinidad and 
Tobago’s independence Constitution, explained in response to a proposal to 
include a referendum requirement in the revised Constitution: 
We disagree. In our view, a referendum is not a particularly accurate 
method of determining the state of public opinion on issues of 
constitutional reform. Under a system of party politics it is quite probable 
that many an answer given will not be an answer on the merits of the 
question asked, but will merely reflect loyalty to what is known to be the 
party’s view, lest defeat of the party on the issue submitted should result 
                                                        
23 S A de Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions (Stevens and Sons; London; 1964) 
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in a consequences too undesirable to be permitted. Accordingly, we reject 
the idea of a referendum as the final prerequisite for amending the 
Constitution. 24 
Everywhere else, however, provision was made for certain constitutional 
amendments to require the additional approval of voters in a referendum. In 
most cases a simple majority of the electors voting in the referendum is all that is 
needed.25 However, in three countries - Antigua,26 St Vincent and the 
Grenadines,27 and Grenada28 - approval by a two-thirds majority in a referendum 
is necessary.29 In the Federation of St Kitts and Nevis also, a two-thirds majority 
of the voters in Nevis is required in order for Nevis to secede from the 
Federation.30 To appreciate the rationale for the inclusion of such onerous 
referendum requirements it is necessary first to  understand the decolonisation 
process in the eastern Caribbean and the extent to which this was informed by 
the British Government’s fears of what might happen after independence.  
 
3. Constitution-making in the Eastern Caribbean 
Immediately prior to independence the islands of the eastern Caribbean – 
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia and St 
Vincent and the Grenadines – enjoyed ‘Associated State’ status under the West 
Indies Act 1967 (WIA 1967).  As well as bestowing full internal self-government 
upon these countries, s.10 WIA 1967 made provision for the termination of their 
status as Associated States prior to independence. This differed depending upon 
whether it was the British Government or the Associated State that wished to 
terminate the association. In the first case, the association could be terminated 
                                                        
24 Report of the Constitution Commission of Trinidad and Tobago (January 22, 1974) pp.s 430 – 
431. Available at <http://www.ttparliament.org/documents/1101.pdf> 
25 The Bahamas, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts and St Lucia. 
26 s.47(5)(c) 
27 s.38(30(b) 
28 s.39(5)(c) 
29 In St Kitts and Nevis, a two thirds majority of the electors in Nevis in a referendum is required 
if Nevis wishes to secede from the Federation of St Kitts and Nevis. s.113 Constitution.  
30 In Jamaica too, a two-thirds or three-fifths majority may be required in a referendum, but this 
is only if the amendment has previously been rejected by the Senate.  
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by a relatively straightforward procedure, which required only that the British 
Government give the Associated State concerned six months’ notice of its 
intention to terminate the status of association, followed by an Order-in-Council 
of Her Majesty approved by a resolution of each House of the British 
Parliament.31 In the second case, a Bill providing for termination required the 
support of not less than two-thirds of all the elected members of the legislature 
of the Associated State and no less than two-thirds of the votes cast in a 
referendum.32 The WIA thus offered a mechanism through which the will of the 
people could be expressed by holding a referendum prior to termination of the 
association with Britain. Deciding which of the available routes to independence 
should be followed proved, however, to be a highly contentious matter in a 
number of the Associated States. This was because in many cases opposition 
groups, even if they supported independence in principle, wanted a referendum 
to be held prior to termination of the association, whereas the British 
Government preferred to proceed by a simple Order-in-Council.  
One of the most notorious examples of disagreement between opposition groups 
and the British Government occurred in Grenada, which at the time was 
governed by the Grenada United Labour Party, led by Eric Gairy, who had once 
been memorably described in a Colonial Office briefing as ‘a man who is almost 
too bad to be true’.33 Gairy had previously been excluded from Grenada’s 
Legislative Council as a result of electoral malpractice during the 1957 elections, 
and in June 1962 had been dismissed from office as Chief Minister by the British 
Government as a result of a report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Control 
of Public Expenditure in Grenada. 34 Though Gairy was returned to office, 
following his party’s victory in the 1967 elections, his authoritarian style of 
leadership had not changed, and in the years leading up to independence he 
                                                        
31 s.10(2) WIA 1967 
32 s.10(1) WIA 1967. There would also have to be an interval of not less than 90 days between the 
introduction of the Bill and its second reading. 
33 TNA: CO 1031/5218, Personality Notes for the Windwards Constitutional Talks, 18 April 1966. 
Quoted by S Mawby, Ordering Independence: The End of Empire in the Anglophone Caribbean, 
1947-69 (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, UK; 2012) 216 
34 The report found that Gairy had been implicated in ‘the deliberate and systematic violation of 
financial regulations, the browbeating of public servants’ and ‘the illegal purchase with public 
monies of luxury items’. For the full report see Parliamentary papers 1961-1962: Cmnd.1735. 
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embarked on what Mawby has described as ‘a policy of repression in which any 
challenges to his personal rule were interpreted as a threat to political order in 
Grenada.’35 It was during this period that Gairy established a special secret police 
force made up principally of ex-convicts,36 known locally as the ‘Mongoose Gang’. 
Their role, which has been compared to that of Haiti’s Tonton Macoutes, was to 
intimidate opposition groups, such as the emerging New Jewel Movement (NJM): 
a coalition of Marxists, Black Power activists and liberal reformists. NJM leaders 
were subject to brutal attacks by Gairy’s Mongoose Gang, which left them with 
serious head injuries, broken jaws and teeth,37 and which culminated in the in 
the killing, in January 1974, of one of the leaders of the NJM, Rupert Bishop.38 
Notwithstanding Gairy’s appalling record of authoritarianism and of brutal 
political repression, the British Government was happy to terminate Grenada’s 
status of association by means of a simple Order-in-Council, rather than accede 
to the opposition’s request for a referendum to be held.  
While it may have been the most notorious, Grenada was not the only example of 
an eastern Caribbean island where there was profound disagreement about 
whether or not a referendum should be held prior to the termination of 
association with Britain. In St Lucia, tensions between the governing and 
opposition parties over this issue were of such concern to the British 
Government that the possibility of having a Royal Navy Ship close at hand as a 
precautionary measure was actively considered39 Nevertheless, the British 
Government was determined to proceed to independence without a referendum 
on the basis that: 
Any attempt by the British Government to delay a decision on 
independence would be to go against the wishes of an elected 
Government with universal adult suffrage and be seen locally as support 
for the St Lucia opposition. This would cause dismay among other 
                                                        
35 Mawby n42 above, 215-222. 
36 Ibid. 
37 HC Deb 11 December 1973 vol 866 cc331-61 
38 Rupert Bishop’s son, Maurice Bishop, went on to lead the coup which eventually removed 
Gairy from power in 1978. 
39 Report of St Lucia Constitutional Reform Commission 2011, p.62. Unpublished. On file with 
author. 
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Commonwealth Caribbean Governments and could have a serious effect 
on the progress of the three remaining Associated States to 
independence.40  
The essence of the British Government’s thinking on the utility of referendums in 
this context is perfectly encapsulated in a report to the Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in connection with the Dominican 
Government’s request for independence. Responding to demands by opposition 
groups for a referendum to be held in Dominica prior to the termination of its 
association with the United Kingdom, the report’s author summarily dismissed 
the suggestion on the basis that: ‘It [a referendum] seemed to me a rather blunt 
instrument to use to decide complex constitutional issues.’41 The author of the 
report was, instead, supportive of the Dominican Government’s decision not to 
hold a referendum that would require the approval of a two-thirds majority of its 
citizens: ‘Few governments would be confident of obtaining such a massive 
plurality on any public issue.’42 In conclusion, the author of the report candidly 
admitted that: 
The British Government’s consistent policy [has] been to be guided by 
what seemed to British Ministers to be the wishes of the majority of the 
territory. I do not think that further evidence of popular opinion can 
reasonably be demanded.43  
Notwithstanding the British Government’s scepticism about the value of 
referendums as a measure of the expression of the will of the people, referendum 
requirements were included in the independence Constitutions of all six 
Associated States.  
As Tierney argues, a referendum requirement may be justified in plural societies 
where they are necessary specifically to protect the interests of particular 
minorities and the consent of the specific minorities should be part of any 
                                                        
40 Ibid 
41 Dominica, Termination of Association: A Report to the Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs by RN Posnett. Cmnd. 7279, paragraph 39. 
42Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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legitimate consensus on the issue at hand.44 Such a justification did not, however, 
apply in the case of these Associated States, which were not in any sense plural 
societies. The inclusion of a referendum requirement in their case arose instead 
from the British Government’s deep distrust of the region’s independence 
leaders; especially Gairy in Grenada, Vere Bird in Antigua, and Ebenezer Joshua 
in St Vincent and the Grenadines, all of whom had fallen foul of the Colonial 
Office at different times on their country’s journey to independence.45 It is thus 
no coincidence that the independence Constitutions of these three countries 
contain some of the most heavily entrenched constitutional provisions to be 
found anywhere in the Commonwealth, let alone the Caribbean, requiring two-
thirds approval in a referendum before they can be amended.46  
Such onerous referendum requirements are self-evidently counter-majoritarian. 
They permit a relatively small percentage of the population to veto constitutional 
reform. As Oran Doyle observes in his chapter, ‘The Justification of Constraints 
on Constitutional Amendment Powers’ (Chapter ?), constitutional devices that 
place a polity’s democratic structure beyond the reach of contemporary 
democratic majorities are, democratically, deeply suspect.  This did not, 
however, appear to concern the British Government at the time. As the report on 
the termination of association of Dominica made clear, the British Government 
was perfectly aware that the possibility of any government being able to secure a 
two-thirds majority in a referendum on constitutional reform was vanishingly 
remote. The inclusion of such a requirement was thus clearly intended to place 
the system of government inherited upon independence beyond the reach of a 
future democratic majority of the citizens of these islands, thereby guaranteeing 
the preservation of the Westminster model whatever happened in the post-
independence era.  
 
                                                        
44 S Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 271. 
45 Mawby, n42 above at 215-231. 
46 s.38 St Vincent and the Grenadines Constitution, s.39 Grenada Constitution; and s.47 
Constitution Antigua and Barbuda. 
 13 
PART II POST-INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND 
AMENDMENT CULTURE 
In this section I wish, firstly, to examine the impact of the two main categories of 
formal amendment rules – special legislative majorities and referendum 
requirements – upon post-independence constitutional reform. I will then  
before proceed to explore the interaction of these amendment rules with the 
region’s amendment culture.  
 
1. Special Legislative Majorities  
It is an indisputable fact that where constitutional reform has occurred in the 
region, with the exception of Guyana’s  ‘socialist’ Constitution of 1980 (which is 
discussed in more detail below), it has occurred where there has been no 
referendum requirement to satisfy. It is no coincidence, therefore,  that two of 
the most constitutionally active countries in the region have been Trinidad and 
Tobago and Belize, both of which have constitutions that do not include a 
referendum requirement. Trinidad and Tobago was thus able in 1976 to move 
from a constitutional monarchy to a republic by means of a two-thirds legislative 
majority. This was no obstacle to Eric Williams and his Peoples National 
Movement, which had led the country into independence, and which had 
consistently won at least two-thirds of the available seats in parliament in each 
of the post-independence elections up until 1986.  In Belize there were no less 
than eight amendments to the Constitution in the decade between 2001 and 
2011.47 Again this was possible because in each of the general elections from 
1998 up until 2008 the winning party had won over three-quarters of the 
available seats in parliament and was, therefore, comfortably able to satisfy the 
special legislative majorities required by s.69 to amend the Constitution.  
It is also no coincidence that in the case of two of the other most constitutionally 
active countries - Guyana and Jamaica – the amendments which have been 
                                                        
47 GP Smith, ‘Constitutionalism in Belize: Lessons for the Commonwealth Caribbean’, University 
West Indies, Faculty Workshop Series 2008-9, 2008. Unpublished. On file with the author. 
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enacted have been to those provisions in each Constitution which were not 
subject to a referendum requirement. Thus, in 1970, Guyana was able to replace 
the Queen as head of state with a ceremonial President by a simple legislative 
majority because express provision had been made for such an amendment in 
the independence Constitution.48 In Jamaica too, the single most important 
constitutional reform that has taken place since independence - the replacement 
of the Bill of Rights included in its independence Constitution with a new Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms - was possible because it could be 
implemented by means of a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament 
and did not require approval in a referendum.  
 
2. Referendums 
There have, to date, been four constitutionally mandated referendums in the 
post-independence era: in Guyana, Nevis, the Bahamas, and St Vincent and the 
Grenadines. In this section I will first explore the local factors which were 
particular to each and how they contributed to the outcome before proceeding in 
the following section to discuss the wider amendment culture in the region and 
how this too contributed to the outcome. I will begin with what was, 
undoubtedly, the most controversial referendum to have taken place in the 
region since Jamaica voted to withdraw from the West Indies Federation in 1961, 
and that is Guyana’s referendum in 1978, which paved the way for Guyana to 
become a ‘socialist Republic’. 
A. Guyana 
In the period between independence and the establishment of a ‘socialist’ 
Constitution in 1980 there were a number of formal amendments to the 
Guyanese Constitution, none of which required a referendum to be held. For 
example, in 1970 the Queen was replaced as Head of State and the right of appeal 
to the JCPC was abolished.49  However, the constitutional reforms that could be 
                                                        
48 Article 73(5) Guyana Independence Constitution 1966. 
49 Art 73(5) Guyana Independence Constitution 1966. 
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achieved by means of a legislative majority alone were not enough to satisfy the 
Peoples National Congress (PNC), who argued that a wholesale reform of the 
1966 Constitution was needed in order to achieve their political objective of 
transforming Guyana into a ‘Socialist Cooperative Republic’. The first step 
towards achieving this objective was to introduce a Bill in the National Assembly 
to amend Article 73 of the Constitution, the effect of which would be to remove 
the referendum requirement for the constitutional reforms that the Government 
was contemplating. Thus, whilst the Bill to amend Article 73 would itself have to 
be ratified by a referendum, once the Bill had been enacted large parts of the 
Constitution could be amended by a two thirds majority of the National 
Assembly. Since the PNC had hijacked the administration of elections shortly 
after its victory in the 1968 elections, and had secured 37 out of the 53 available 
seats in the National Assembly at the elections in 1973, which were themselves 
widely believed to have been rigged, achieving such a legislative majority 
presented no obstacle to the PNC. This would mean that in future the PNC would 
be able to amend large parts of the Constitution at their will. 
The referendum that preceded the amendment of Article 73 of the Constitution 
has been described by Lutchman as ‘one of the bitterest political and 
constitutional controversies in the history of Guyana’.50 It also confirms Tierney’s 
observation that the egregious manipulation of referendums tends to occur most 
often in countries where there is already an established pattern of electoral 
misconduct.51   
During the campaign the Government conducted an ‘extensive and aggressive 
propaganda exercise’.52 This was made possible because, post-independence, the 
PNC had promulgated the idea that all institutions under public control, such as 
the media, should be mobilised in support of the socialist cause as embodied by 
the PNC.53 Opposition groups were not allowed to place advertisements  in the 
state-owned media and pressure was brought to bear on those sections of the 
                                                        
50 RW James and HA Lutchman, Law and the Political Environment in Guyana (Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Guyana; Guyana; 1984) 61 
51 Tierney n52 above at 102. 
52 James and Lutchman n61 above at 64 
53Ibid, 65. 
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media that were not under direct governmental ownership; for example, cutting 
off the supply of newsprint or the termination of advertising contracts with the 
Government.54  Those who were opposed to the Government’s plans to amend 
Article 73 experienced difficulty in securing permission to hold their meetings. 
Even where permission was granted the meetings were disrupted by PNC 
supporters in the presence of police officers who did not seek to intervene.55 The 
collective actions of the Government resulted in a decision by opposition groups 
to boycott the referendum altogether and the Government, unsurprisingly, 
succeeded in winning an outright majority in the referendum. 
Contrary to the PNC’s claims that a majority of the registered voters had taken 
part in the referendum and had overwhelmingly voted to approve the 
amendment of Article 73, Lutchman argues that the results of the referendum 
‘must rank as among the most corrupt results ever in an election type exercise’.56  
Certainly, there was widespread suspicion about the results, based on the fact 
that a ‘derisively minuscule’ proportion of the population had actually voted in 
the referendum.57 In protest, opposition groups refused to take part in the 
Constituent Assembly that was subsequently established by the Government and 
charged with the task of drafting the new Constitution. The result was that the 
draft Constitution that was approved by the Constituent Assembly was 
substantially the same in form and substance as the draft that had been 
submitted to the Constituent Assembly by the PNC.58  
In the subsequent elections in 1980, which should have taken place in 1978, but 
were postponed to allow the referendum to take place, the PNC increased its 
majority still further, winning 41 out of the 53 sets in the National Assembly. 
B. Nevis 
St Kitts and Nevis, which achieved independence in 1983, is the world’s smallest 
federation. Though the two islands had first been linked when a party of British 
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colonists from St Kitts landed on Nevis in 1628, political relations between the 
islands have been tense ever since the British government decided in 1882 to 
unite the islands (together with the island of Anguilla) into one administrative 
unit.  This tension is reflected in s.113 of the independence Constitution, which 
expressly provides for Nevis to secede from the federation if this is approved by 
a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Nevis Assembly and two-thirds of 
Nevisians in a referendum.  
For the first decade of independence the secession issue remained latent. 
However, it resurfaced in 1996. The catalyst on this occasion was the federal 
government’s plans to regulate offshore financial services within the 
federation.59 The Nevis administration contended that the federal government’s 
real objective was to place the financial and business sectors of Nevis under its 
control and direction, the effect of which would have been to undermine the 
constitutional and legislative authority of Nevis at the same time as destroying 
its economy.60 The Concerned Citizens Movement (CCM), having won a majority 
in the 1997 elections to the Nevis Assembly in which the CCM had pledged to 
hold a referendum on secession, the Premier of Nevis, Vance Amory, 
immediately invoked s.113 of the Constitution and tabled a Separation Bill. The 
Bill was approved by all five members of the Nevis Assembly, and thus easily 
satisfied the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution.  However, in the 
subsequent referendum, which was held on 10th August 1998, ‘unaccountably 
and to the surprise of nearly all observers’, the requisite two-thirds of the 
electorate did not vote in favour of secession. On what was a relatively low 
turnout only 61.7% of those who took part in the referendum voted in favour of 
secession.61 
Two possible reasons for the Government’s failure to win the necessary two-
thirds majority in the referendum have been suggested. The first was the 
lobbying of the electorate by political leaders elsewhere in the region who were 
haunted by the spectre of secession in their own multi-island states: for example, 
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Antigua and Barbuda and Trinidad and Tobago. The second, according to 
Midgett, was the absence of a meaningful political movement that could realise 
the goal of secession.62 Nevisians may have been ardent separatists but, in the 
final analysis, an insufficient number of Nevisians were ‘willing to take the 
political step of re-creating themselves as a nation-state.’63 
 
C.  The Bahamas 
The Constitution of the Bahamas has remained virtually unaltered in the 40 odd 
years of its existence. Prior to 2002 there had been some minor constitutional 
amendments, such as changing the definition of the financial year, none of which 
required a referendum. However, amending the Constitution in this way is very 
much the exception to the rule, since 104 of the 137 Articles of the Constitution 
require approval in a referendum before they can be amended.64 Accordingly, in 
2002, when the Government wished to make a number of reforms to the 
Constitution, having achieved the necessary two-thirds majorities in both Houses 
of Parliament, it still needed to obtain majority approval in a referendum.  
The reforms that were proposed included: the removal of discriminatory  
provisions relating to women under the citizenship section; the inclusion of 
gender as a prohibited ground of discrimination; the establishment of a 
Parliamentary Commissioner; the transfer of the Attorney General’s powers 
relating to criminal proceedings to a newly established Director of Public 
Prosecutions; putting the Teaching Services Commission on an equal footing 
with other Public Service Commissions; the establishment of a Boundaries 
Commission to carry out the functions previously exercised by the 
Constituencies Review Commission; and an extension of the retirement age for 
senior judges. Though progressive, these reforms were, essentially, very modest, 
leaving the basic structure of government virtually unchanged. Nevertheless, the 
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Government still failed to secure the approval of a majority of the voters in the 
referendum.  
The Constitutional Review Commission, which reported in 2013, suggested that 
there were a number of interlocking reasons why the government failed to win 
popular approval for its package of reforms. These included: the contamination 
of the referendum by other political controversies; the imminence of a general 
election; ambivalent feelings about the gender-equality aspects of the citizen-
related proposals; the complexity of the Constitutional Amendment Bills; and, 
lastly, a lack of public education about the proposed amendments.65  
D. St Vincent and the Grenadines 
St Vincent and the Grenadine’s 2009 referendum on constitutional reform offers 
the perfect antithesis to Guyana’s 1978 referendum, both in terms of its 
legitimacy and in terms of the efforts that were made by the Government to 
engage civil society in the reform process. This process began in 2003 with the 
honouring of a manifesto commitment by the United Labour Party to establish, 
on a statutory basis, a Constitution Review Commission (CRC), which was 
charged with consulting widely before making recommendations for the reform 
of the Constitution. The CRC was composed of 25 people from a cross-section of 
the political, social and legal community (including the diaspora). The process of 
consultation was thorough, with various publications being produced along the 
way, outlining the options available and summarising the level of progress 
achieved. There was also a significant effort to encourage input from across 
Vincentian society and the wider diaspora.66  
The CRC’s report was published in 2005, and again in revised form in 2006. It 
was comprehensive and recommended a number of major reforms to the 
country’s Constitution. These included: the removal of the British monarch as 
head of state and her replacement with a ceremonial president; an increase in 
the number of elected members of the National Assembly from 15 to 17; the 
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addition of seven ‘civil society’ senators; limiting the Prime Minister to two 
terms in office and reducing his role in bureaucratic appointments; capping the 
number of ministers to 13 to ensure that the cabinet does not have a majority in 
the legislature; and establishing a National Advisory Council of Elders (NACE) 
which would provide ‘the conscience of the nation.’  
Once the draft Constitution had been finalised 15,000 copies were printed and 
distributed cheaply to ensure that most people in the country – of approximately 
30,000 households – would have access to it. In addition there were numerous 
town hall meetings where the Drafting Committee, along with members of the 
Constitutional Reform Steering Committee – a slimmed-down version of the CRC 
– and Government, discussed the process with the wider population. These 
meetings were broadcast live on national radio, continuing the pattern of 
television and radio coverage that had accompanied many of the parliamentary 
debates on the subject. All of this public deliberation and consultation was not 
enough, however, to persuade a sufficient majority of the electorate (two thirds) 
of the need for constitutional reform, and the Constitutional Reform Bill was, 
ultimately, rejected by 55 per cent of voters in the referendum.  
Bishop has suggested a number of reasons for the Government’s failure to win 
the referendum, such as the length of the draft Constitution, which was a massive 
tome, running to 160 pages, ‘with endless clauses and clarifications used to 
codify the myriad new institutions’, unlikely to  enthuse a population that had 
already been subjected to six years of public debate about constitutional reform. 
67 Bishop also points out that the draft Constitution was very much a watered-
down version of the much more radical reforms recommended by the CRC. There 
was no limit on the number of terms of office that a Prime Minister could serve, 
there was no room for the seven civil society’s senators, and no place for NACE. 
Ultimately, while the draft Constitution included some significant reforms it was 
not sufficiently ‘uplifting’ to transcend party politics.68  
The Prime Minister of St Vincent, Ralph Gonsalves, while apportioning much of 
the blame for the failure of his government’s efforts to implement constitutional 
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reform, was also highly critical of the two-thirds referendum requirement in his 
country’s independence Constitution. According to Prime Minister Gonsalves, 
this was a relic of colonialism that had been introduced by the British 
Government ‘to counter the type of authoritarianism that had been the hallmark 
of Eric Gairy in Grenada’ and ‘to neuter radical approaches to governance in the 
early post-independence era.’69 Indeed, at a recent conference in Jamaica, Prime 
Minister Gonsalves revealed that he never realistically expected that his 
government would succeed in achieving a two-thirds majority in the 
referendum. Nevertheless, he pressed ahead with the referendum, hoping that it 
would be possible to secure a simple majority vote. This, he believed, would have 
provided him with a sufficient democratic mandate to invoke the constituent 
power by inviting the British Government to amend St Vincent’s Independence 
Constitution in the same way that it had been created, i.e. by an Order-in-Council 
of Her Majesty.70  
 
3. Amendment culture 
It is clear that there is a degree of correlation between constitutional design and 
constitutional amendment as measured by reference to the frequency of 
constitutional amendment in those countries where the only requirement is a 
special legislative majority and those countries where, in addition to a special 
legislative majority, a majority of voters in a referendum is required. It is also 
clear, however, that, viewed in the round, the formal amendment rules have not 
served to fulfil the function envisaged by Elkins et al of promoting flexibility by 
allowing these constitutions to adapt to meet changing political, social and 
economic circumstances. More often than not, they have simply preserved the 
status quo ante, thereby fulfilling the role intended for them by the region’s 
political leaders at the time of independence and by the British Government.  
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This does not, however, answer the underlying question of why so many 
governments have been unable to satisfy the amendment requirements of their 
constitutions. In the case of those countries with very onerous referendum 
requirements, it is possible to argue that a two thirds majority represented an 
impossibly high threshold for any Government to satisfy, as demonstrated by the 
failure of the Government of Nevis to persuade a two thirds majority of its 
citizens to vote for secession. However, in the case of St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, the Government was unable to persuade even a simple majority of 
its citizens to vote for its package of reforms. The Government was, therefore, in 
no different position to the Government of the Bahamas, which also failed to 
persuade a simple majority of its citizens to vote for what were essentially very 
modest constitutional reforms. There were, of course, as we have seen in both 
cases, local factors at play. However, the lack of political consensus generally 
around constitutional reform and the inability of governments even to obtain a 
simple majority in a referendum process which they, effectively, control points to 
the existence of a wider amendment culture in the region, which transcends the 
institutional obstacles presented by formal amendment rules, and which exists 
‘independently of the substantive issue under consideration,’71 But what factors 
have contributed to the emergence of such a culture in the region? 
One factor, which has been mentioned by scholars, such as Sutton, is the deeply 
conservative nature of the political culture of the region, which derives in part 
from the small size of almost all of the countries in the region (small states 
tending to be quite conservative), but also from the history of slavery and 
assimilation in the region.72 As Sutton explains, as ‘free people of colour’ 
emerged as elements of a middle class in the years following the abolition of 
slavery their value system was shaped by the metropolitan connection and the 
colonial elite who represented it in the individual colony. 73This was further 
buttressed by the brief tutelage of the region’s political leaders in the operation 
of the so-called Westminster model of government in the decade or so leading up 
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to independence.74 This meant that by the time of independence local political 
leaders were very well versed in the system of government embodied in their 
independence constitutions.  As Norman Manley, the Premier of Jamaica at the 
time its independence Constitution was being negotiated, explained: 
I make no apology for the fact that we did not attempt to embark upon 
any original or novel exercise for constitution-building. We had a system 
which we understood; we had been operating it for many years with 
sense. It’s a system which has endured in other countries for generations 
successfully. It is a system which is consistent with the sort of ideals we 
have in this country, and it was not difficult to decide that we would 
follow that familiar system with those modifications which we thought 
the circumstances of Independence deserved. 
Within the region there was not, therefore, the sense of a lack of autochthony 
which Wheare had predicted would compel these newly independent countries 
very quickly to replace their constitutions with something ‘homegrown’. There 
was not the appetite for constitutional amendment which existed in Britain’s 
former colonies in Africa, such as Ghana and Tanzania. Instead, there was a 
popular attachment to the text of these constitutions which has not only survived  
independence, but which appears actually to have grown in the intervening 
period.  
A second factor is the political tribalism and adversarialism, which has become 
so engrained in the region’s political culture as a result of the ‘winner takes all’ 
nature of the ‘first past the post electoral system’, which is the electoral system 
of choice across the region. 75 Where constitutional reform has taken place, as in 
Trinidad and Tobago and in Belize, it has occurred during a period when the 
government has had a sufficiently large legislative majority that it has been able 
to press ahead with reform without the need for the support of the opposition. 
Absent an in-built majority, governments have found it almost impossible to 
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build a political consensus around constitutional reform. In Jamaica, for example, 
it proved impossible for the People’s National Party when in power to garner the 
requisite two-thirds legislative majority to amend the Constitution in order to 
replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) with the Caribbean 
Court of Justice (CCJ) as the country’s final appellate court, even though the 
amendment enjoyed considerable popular support.76 In Trinidad and Tobago 
too, an attempt by the Government in 2011 to amend the Constitution to 
preclude constitutional challenge to the implementation of the death penalty by 
prisoners based on the grounds of delay or inhuman or degrading prison 
conditions failed because the Government was unable to achieve the 31 votes in 
the House of Representatives that were needed to amend the Constitution, even 
though the death penalty is extremely popular with voters in Trinidad and 
Tobago.77 While it is true that in Jamaica the Government was able to build the 
necessary political consensus to achieve the two thirds majority of both Houses 
of Parliament required to replace its Bill of Rights with a new Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, it took nearly two decades, and a number of 
compromises with regard to the contents of the Charter, in order to achieve this 
consensus.78  
Bishop also notes that the failure of the Government of St Vincent and 
Grenadines to win even a nominal majority in the referendum on constitutional 
referendum was in no small part due to the fact that the bipartisanship, which 
had accompanied the creation of the CRC and which had been maintained for the 
first few years of public consultation, had completely dissipated by 2007, with 
the opposition New Democratic Party withdrawing from the entire process.79 
Here, as elsehere in the region, the levels of political tribalism and 
adversarialism generated by a ‘winner takes all’ culture created an environment 
of distrust which was not conducive to consensus-building around constitutional 
reform. As Contiades and Fotiadou argue in Chapter (?), ‘Amendment-Metrics: 
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The Good, the Bad, and Frequently Amended Constitution’, a culture of distrust 
exerts an immense influence on the way that the mechanisms of constitutional 
amendment operate.  
A third factor which has contributed to amendment culture in a number of 
countries is the institutional structure surrounding the amendment process. As 
Ginsburg and Melton have argued, it is possible that a low threshold for 
amending the constitution can lead to the exercise of caution when 
constitutional reform is being proposed precisely because it is too easy.80 
Evidence of just such a phenomenon can be found in the emergence of an implied 
referendum requirement amongst those countries in the region with 
constitutions that do include an express referendum requirement: Barbados, 
Belize, and Trinidad and Tobago.  
In Barbados, for example, following the recommendation of the Forde 
Commission, in 1998, that Barbados should become a parliamentary republic, 
with a President replacing the Queen as Head of State,81 it would have been 
perfectly possible for the Government to have acted upon this proposal and to 
have amended the Constitution by means of a two-thirds majority in both 
Houses of Parliament. In both the 1999 and 2003 elections the Barbados Labour 
Party had won with large majorities. These translated into 26 of the 28 seats 
available in the 1999 elections and 25 out of the out of the 28 seats available in 
the 2003 elections. Notwithstanding its overwhelming electoral mandate, the 
Government decided, however, that such a fundamental constitutional reform 
needed to be put to the vote of the people in a referendum. A Referendum Bill 
was, accordingly, introduced in parliament in 2000, but for various reasons was 
not enacted until 2005. Though the Referendum Act 2005 did not itself fix a date 
for the referendum to be held, the Government decided that to save costs it 
should coincide with the date of the next general election in 2008.  In the event, 
however, the referendum was not held in 2008 and has been deferred by 
successive governments ever since. 
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In Trinidad and Tobago too it would be perfectly possible, from a strictly legal 
perspective, to amend the Constitution by means of a two-thirds legislative 
majority in order to abolish the right of appeal to the JCPC and to replace it with 
a right of appeal to the CCJ.82 However, the Prime Minister, Kamla Persad 
Bissessar, has recently announced that before any such amendment can take 
place it will have to be approved by the people in a referendum, in accordance 
with the recommendation of the 2013 Report of the Constitution Reform 
Commission (CRC).83 Though it is true that because of the strained relationship 
between the Government and the Opposition it would have been difficult for the 
Government to achieve the two-thirds legislative majority necessary to 
implement this amendment, the acceptance by the Prime Minister of the need for 
a referendum, where none is required by the Constitution, still represents a 
remarkable acknowledgment of implied constraints on the amending power of 
the constitutional legislator. The CRC has even gone one stage further by 
recommending that not only this reform, but also a host of other constitutional 
reforms which it was recommending, should only be introduced following 
majority approval in a referendum, though this is not strictly required by the 
Constitution.84  
 Finally, in Belize, which has been one of the most constitutionally active 
countries in the post-independence era the Government eventually came 
unstuck in its efforts to reform the Constitution in 2008 when attempting to 
introduce legislation to remove the protection afforded by section 17(1) of the 
Constitution to the owners of: 
[P]etroleum minerals and accompanying substances, in whatever physical 
state located on or under the territory of Belize … the entire property and 
control over which are exclusively vested, and shall be deemed always to 
have been so vested, in the Government of Belize.85 
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In proceedings brought by a group of disgruntled landowners, Bowen v Attorney 
General,86 the proposed amendment was struck down, even though it had been 
approved by the special three-quarters majority required by s.69 of the 
Constitution, on the ground that it offended the ‘basic structure’ of the 
Constitution. According to the Chief Justice Conteh, s.69 was no more than a 
‘procedural handbook’, whereas the Constitution is ‘the embodiment and 
immanation of the people of Belize as a whole: it is their constitution.’87 It 
followed, therefore, that a fundamental reform of the Constitution, such as the 
disapplication of the fundamental rights guarantee contained in section 17(1), 
could only be achieved by means of a referendum, even if this was not expressly 
required by the Constitution. Following the judgment in Bowen, the Government 
tried for a second time to amend s.17 of the Constitution by simultaneously 
amending s.69 of the Constitution to provide that once a Bill had received the 
approval of the special legislative majority required by the Constitution the 
constitutionality of the Bill could not be reviewed by the courts. Once again, 
however, the Government’s attempt to effect such a fundamental reform of the 
Constitution without securing the approval of the people in a referendum was 
struck down by the Supreme Court.88  
In all three countries then a norm is clearly emerging at the political/judicial 
level, which regards fundamental constitutional reform that has not been 
mandated by the majority of citizens in a referendum as democratically 
unacceptable, even if it appears to be permitted by the constitutional text. The 
emergence of such a norm points to a special political weight being accorded to 
the value of entrenchment in these countries and to an amendment culture 
which is responsive to the constitution’s institutional structure.  
 
Conclusion 
                                                        
86 BZ 2009 SC 2. Unreported. Available at <www.belizelaw.org>. 
87 This was because the Belize Act 1981 passed by the UK Parliament expressly recognised 
Belize’s self-governing status and the right of the Belizean Parliament to amend the Order-in-
Council issued by Her majesty, which it did in September 1981.  
88 British Caribbean Bank Ltd v Attorney General Belize, Claim No. 597 of 2011. Unreported. 
Available at <www.belizelaw.org>. 
 28 
As our survey of constitutional reform in the region indicates, there is only very 
limited evidence to support the theory that formal amendment rules contribute 
to constitutional endurance by allowing constitutions to be amended rather than 
being replaced in their entirety. As we have seen, there has been very little 
amendment of the region’s constitutions in the post-independence era. Indeed, 
there is plentiful evidence that in a number of cases the formal amendment rules 
included in the region’s constitutions have instead acted as a barrier to 
constitutional amendment. This is especially true of those countries with 
constitutions which include a referendum requirement. As we have seen, only 
one government, the PNC in Guyana, has so far succeeded in obtaining the 
support of the requisite majority of its electors in a referendum for its 
constitutional reform programme, and it is widely suspected that the PNC only 
managed to achieve this by manipulating all aspects of the referendum process.  
To this extent, at least, they have functioned in exactly the way they were 
designed to function by the region’s political leaders at the time of independence 
and by the British Government.  
It is thus with some justification that the Prime Minister of St Vincent  and the 
Grenadines has complained that the very onerous referendum requirements 
included in his country’s Constitution were ‘a colonial anachronism’, obliging 
him to consider taking the extraordinary step of inviting the former colonial 
ruler, retrospectively, to amend his country’s Constitution. To paraphrase Joshua 
Braver in his Chapter (?), ‘Hannah Arendt in Venezuela: The Supreme Court 
Battles Hugo Chavez Over the Creation of the 1999 Constitution’, the citizens of 
these countries were born into a constitutional history and narrative that was 
not of their choosing and from which it is nearly impossible for them to break 
free. 
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that referendum requirements are the 
only reason for the glacial pace of constitutional reform in the region. As we have 
seen, regard must also be had to the amendment culture abroad in the region, 
which is indicative of an underlying level of resistance to constitutional reform. 
This suggests an attachment to the text of the region’s independence 
constitutions that defies the predictions of scholars that they would soon be 
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replaced after independence and is in marked contrast to the lack of attachment 
to their founding texts manifested by the citizens of Britain’s former colonies in 
Africa, in countries such as Tanzania and Ghana, which replaced their 
constitutions very shortly after independence. There are a number of factors that 
have contributed to the emergence of such a culture, including the experience of 
colonial rule in the Commonwealth Caribbean, which included an extended 
period of self-government prior to independence, and a degree of political 
tribalism which is inimical to building a consensus around constitutional reform. 
There is also the emergence of a norm in response to the threat of constitutional 
amendment by special legislative majority in those countries with constitutions 
that do not include a referendum requirement, which insists that fundamental 
constitutional reform demands the legitimacy that can only be conferred by a 
referendum  
It is impossible to quantify with any degree of exactitude the strength of the 
amendment culture within a single country, let alone across an entire region. 
However, we should soon have a better appreciation of the strength of the 
region’s amendment culture as three constitutional referendums are scheduled 
to take place in the region within the next year: in Grenada, St Lucia and the 
Bahamas. In each case the referendum has been preceded by a Constitutional 
Review Commission, which has consulted widely and deliberated at length.89 A 
failure by the government to obtain a majority in any of these referendums could 
only add weight to the impression that, regardless of the substance of the 
amendments being proposed, there is a pervasive amendment culture at work 
across  the region which is resistant to constitutional reform.  
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